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FOREWORD

Perhaps even more than in Syria and Iraq, the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has suffered a
major defeat in Libya. Originally, Libya was to be the
second province in ISIS’s caliphate, but by 2019 the
group has been defeated militarily and eliminated as
a political force. But this victory has not been matched
by the formation of a stable government and, until this
happens, ISIS or some other jihadist group may stage
a return in the midst of the ongoing chaos. At the time
of this writing, the military campaign by the Libyan
National Army (LNA) has stalled outside Tripoli.
Now is the time for the United States and the wider
international community to step up and help Libya
transition to a unitary government with conventional
elections. If this fails to happen, the hard-won
victory over ISIS in Libya may yet turn out to have
been illusory.

DR. CAROL V. EVANS
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This report argues exploiting the military and
political defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) in Libya to eradicate the group completely from
the country and weaken its capacity to act elsewhere
in North and sub-Saharan Africa is now possible.
In addition, the Libyan conflict continues to have
consequences for the political stability of Europe via
the pressure the migration flows are putting on the
political infrastructure of the continent. In turn, this
instability has implications for the United States’
European strategy, both insofar as commercial
interests are concerned and in US capacity to contain
Russian assertiveness on the edges of NATO territory.
Almost a decade after the fall of the Muammar
Gadhafi regime, Libya effectively has no government.
The UN-backed Government of National Accord
(GNA) is notionally supported by three of the four
main factions in the country, and Turkey is now the
principal external supporter. But these parties are still
squabbling over control of vital regions, the degree of
federalism needed, and control of the military.
The situation is made worse by Emirati, Egyptian,
Saudi, and now Russian sponsorship of the Libyan
National Army (LNA) commanded by General
Khalifah Haftar. The army is opposed to the Libya
Dawn group having any role in the governance
of Libya. In turn, Qatar is happy to fund a range of
radical groups, including the Muslim Brotherhoodaligned Libya Dawn, as part of its dispute with the
Saudis and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Libya has traditionally followed an austere form
of Sunni Islam which, in the nineteenth century, took
the form of the Sanusiyah, a movement that is still
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influential. The Muslim Brotherhood established itself
in Libya in the post–World War II era. Finally, modern
Salafi-jihadist groups such as ISIS, al-Qaeda (AQ), and
local versions tried to establish themselves using the
chaos that has reigned since 2011.
Removing radical Islamist groups from Libya is
therefore impractical. But it is important the influence
of these groups be minimized within a functioning
political system. The Islamic State emerged in Libya
in the post-2011 chaos and thrived due to the lack of
an effective central government. The group has been
driven to the margins, but it can sustain itself from
criminal activities, such as people smuggling, drug
trafficking, and taxing trade across the Sahara, and it
has easy access to weapons and the porous borders of
sub-Saharan Africa.
Establishing effective government in Libya should
be a priority for these reasons. In effect, ending the
civil war between the House of Representatives
(HoR) and the LNA in the east and the GNA in the
west is the key to preventing any return of ISIS. A
pool of potential recruits to ISIS continues to exist
due to economic hardship and real grievances, allowing ISIS to recruit, regroup, and reemerge. If we
are to exploit the strategic defeat of ISIS in Libya, the
overwhelming need is to support the formation of an
effective government.
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RISE AND FALL?
THE RISE AND FALL OF ISIS IN LIBYA
INTRODUCTION
Background
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) managed
to exploit the chaos in Libya after the fall of the
Muammar Gadhafi regime in 2011 and briefly carve
out a degree of control over some coastal cities,
especially Sirte, in 2014. By 2016, ISIS had lost control
of all territory apart from a few isolated regions in
the far south. But the group, largely embedded in
the criminal networks involving people smuggling
and the drug trade, still has a presence in the country
today. Military action by a combination of NATO,
Gulf States, and local forces was enough to eliminate
the threat ISIS might retain control of population
centers and acquire oil revenues as it sought to add a
second province to its caliphate. But framing either the
emergence or the apparent defeat of ISIS in a vacuum
would be a mistake.
The Islamic State’s opportunity arose out of the
post-Gadhafi chaos, its brief period of ascendency
in Iraq and Syria, and key dynamics within Libyan
history and contemporary culture.1 Understanding
the dynamics that led to the rise of ISIS is essential to
preventing them from returning as a significant threat
in Libya or the wider sub-Saharan region.
1.
Azeem Ibrahim, The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Syria
and Iraq (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College Press, 2014).
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Although Libya has only existed as an independent
country since 1951, it has historically been divided into
three main regions: Tripolitania in the west, Cyrenaica
in the east, and a region to the south reaching into
the Sahara. But these regions have usually also been
combined into one state. Although the tensions
among the three regions are real and have had a major
influence on modern Libyan history, the best solution
would most likely not be to fracture the existing state.
Figure 1 shows the provinces into which Libya is
divided today.2

Figure 1. Map of Libya (showing the post-1963
provincial borders)
Map from Congressional Research Service

Beginning in the fifteenth century, Libya was
notionally part of the Ottoman Empire, but was largely
2. Christopher Blanchard, Libya: Transition and US Policy,
RL33142 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April
20, 2016), 5.
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autonomous until the 1840s. Rivalry with European
powers and Ottoman military weakness in Libya led
to Italy claiming the region as a colony in 1911. The
Italian invasion to reinforce this claim was a disaster,
and the Italians signed a peace treaty acknowledging
their withdrawal by 1919. But one of the first acts
of Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime in 1922 was to
abrogate the peace treaty and invade Libya again, with
the Italians eventually claiming victory in 1932. Italian
rule ended with the British occupation of Cyrenaica in
1943. Libya became independent and its pro-Western
monarchy ran Libya basically along federal lines,
with the old regions having considerable autonomy.
Although the discovery of oil reserves led to some
corruption, much of the income was also used to
expand social services, education, and infrastructure.
But the country faced domestic pressure to align itself
more closely with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt. These
pressures led to the 1969 military coup led by officers
like Gadhafi, who were notionally committed to
Nasser’s pan-Arabism; they briefly looked for a union
with Egypt, but this approach ended with Nasser’s
death. Nevertheless, Gadhafi’s rule quickly evolved
into an authoritarian regime that seemed happy to
support almost any violent movement in Africa,
Europe, the Middle East, and beyond.
Since the fall of Gadhafi’s regime in 2011,
governance of Libya has been fragmented. Initially,
four major power blocs were in place. Three were
notionally committed to the UN-backed Government
of National Accord (GNA): the Sanusiyah-influenced
General National Congress (GNC) and the House of
Representatives (HoR), which are based in Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica, respectively, and the Muslim
Brotherhood-influenced Libya Dawn, with its power
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base around Tripoli. These regional and factional
divisions made creating an effective government
difficult. By 2017, the HoR and the LNA, backed by the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and the Saudis,
commenced a military offensive to capture Tripoli
from the GNA and its allies (backed by the UN, Qatar,
and Turkey). By early 2020, the offensive had stalled,
creating an opportunity for a potential political
settlement. But such a solution will not be easy,
especially given the Emirati and Egyptian opposition
to any dealings with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Radical Islamism in Libya
The Sanusiyah movement stressed the need for
simplicity, piety, and the elimination of modern
innovations from Islam. In theory, the movement had
much in common with Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia,
though in practice it proved to be more tolerant of
other forms of Islam and other faiths. The movement
formed the basis of the modernizing, pro-Western
monarchy that ruled from 1951 to 1969.
The Gadhafi regime’s attitude to Islam changed
over time. The regime started out as secular in a
Nasserist mode, but later embraced its own form of
Islam. Gadhafi saw the Sanusis as a major threat—
first as exiled supporters of the monarchy, and later
as Islamist groups trying to overthrow the regime.
Internationally, he backed an eclectic range of
movements, running from the secular Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine to Western European
Marxist terrorist groups and Islamist movements in
sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria (where the regime backed
the movement that has since become Boko Haram),
and the Philippines.
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The religious turmoil created fertile ground that
was later exploited, first by al-Qaeda (AQ), and later
by ISIS. Although the Sanusiyah diverged from
Wahhabism and its modern-day Salafi variant, the two
ideologies have much in common.3 Understanding
modern Libyan politics requires understanding
the relations between the Sanusiyah-inspired
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and the main
international jihadist groupings.4 At a senior level,
the LIFG has kept its distance from AQ and ISIS, but
individual members have often moved to whichever
jihadist group is seen to be the most effective. By the
time of Gadhafi’s fall, the LIFG had been defeated in
Libya and was moving away from terrorism toward a
more political approach. As part of its wider network
in Saharan Africa, AQ, however, had managed to
establish a small presence in Libya prior to 2011.5 This
presence, which was limited to Sirte, mostly comprised
ex-LIFG militants. Al-Qaeda played a minimal role
in the revolt against the Gadhafi regime and sought
to cooperate with other militant groups rather than
supplant them.
The Islamic State developed its presence in Libya
by exploiting the post-Gadhafi chaos and preventing
North African militants from moving to Syria and

3. Azeem Ibrahim, Radical Origins: Why We Are Losing the
Battle against Islamic Extremism—And How to Turn the Tide (New
York: Pegasus Books, 2017).
4. Library of Congress, Al-Qaeda in Libya: A Profile
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, August 2012).
5. Center for International Security and Cooperation
(CISAC), “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Stanford, updated
July
2018,
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants
/profiles/aqim.
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Iraq, thereby building its network.6 The Islamic
State saw Libya as a potential second province in its
caliphate and a region where it could access arms and
supplies. Libya also provided ISIS a useful distraction
from Western pressure in Iraq and Syria and a means
through which to expand the group’s network in
North Africa.7
ISIS’s presence also alienated most potential allies
due to the group’s sectarian approach to other Islamist
groups. The Islamic State was driven out of coastal
strongholds by a combination of Western air strikes
and local militias. The group never gained control of
oil revenues, and it diverted funding and resources to
back an Islamist revolt in the Sinai Peninsula, leaving
its network in Libya short of funds. By 2016, its
remaining fighters had fled to the south, and ISIS was
reduced to extracting revenues from the trans-Saharan
trade, people smuggling, and the drug trade.8
Options
Context matters, and even a modern movement
like ISIS or AQ is embedded in the existing politics,
history, and culture of a region. To ensure neither has
a route to return to prominence in Libya, one must
6. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Libya:
Examination of Intervention and Collapse and the UK’s Future Policy
Options, HC 119 (London, UK: House of Commons, September
14, 2016)
7. Charlie Winter, Libya: The Strategic Gateway for the Islamic
State (London, UK: Quilliam, 2015).
8. Aidan Lewis, “Islamic State Shifts to Libya’s Desert Valleys
after Sirte Defeat,” Reuters, February 10, 2017, https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-libya-security-islamicstate/islamic-state-shifts
-to-libyas-desert-valleys-after-sirte-defeat-idUSKBN15P1GX.
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understand the reason Libya was so attractive to
these groups.
One key issue is Libya has a long history of resisting
external intervention.9 The pirates who preyed on the
central Mediterranean from the fifteenth to the early
nineteenth centuries were feted by both rulers and
the wider populace. The money, slaves, and ransoms
they brought from raids were the bedrock of the local
economy; the loss of this revenue, after the end of the
Napoleonic Wars, allowed the Ottomans to reassert
more direct control in the 1840s. The successful
resistance to Italian colonialism between 1911 and
1919 and the scars of the brutal Italian rule in the 1930s
are part of the national narrative.
Radical Islamism equally has long had a place
in Libya, and the nineteenth-century Sanusiyah
movement added a degree of religious revivalism and
helped fuse religion with nationalism. This fusion has
created an environment where the Sanusiyah-inspired
movements have real ideological and practical
differences from contemporary Salafi movements, but
individual militants cross this divide easily, joining
the group that seems best placed to accomplish their
personal goals.
Effectively, radical Islamism in one form or
another, allied with Libyan nationalism, is not going
to disappear. As long as radical Islamism remains, the
risk of a revival by either AQ or ISIS is real, especially
when both groups can exploit real grievances and the
problems stemming from weak governance.
Creating an effective government must be the
first priority. The GNA is weak and fragmented
9. Ali A. Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation,
Colonization, and Resistance (New York: State University of New
York Press, 2014).
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among the three major political factions in Libya.
This situation is exacerbated by the external influence
of the UAE and Egypt, which sponsor the LNA as a
counterweight primarily because of their opposition
to the Muslim Brotherhood (as well as Qatar’s backing
of the brotherhood). The UN has recognized the GNA
and has urged all external powers to stop sponsoring
individual factions and to try to force dialogue
between them.
Once formed, a central government will need
substantial help, but this help should be provided
on Libya’s own terms. In effect, the government
should be able to request what it needs, rather than
have solutions imposed on it. Many experts and
professionals have either left the country or been
killed in the unrest, and many fear ISIS and AQ have
infiltrated the weak structures that do exist.
THE CONTEXT OF MODERN LIBYA
Up to the late Middle Ages, the political geography
of the land that is now modern Libya was one of
relatively isolated coastal cities engaged in both trade
and piracy across the Mediterranean with a nomadic
tribal population in the regions reaching into the
Sahara. At times, Libya was largely independent,
while at others, it was effectively ruled by its neighbor,
Egypt. At other stages, the various coastal cities
formed local alliances based on the long-standing
divisions of the two coastal regions of Tripolitania in
the west and Cyrenaica in the east.
From the fifteenth century to 1911, Libya was a
province of the Ottoman Empire, though at times the
area was largely independent. Direct Ottoman rule
was reestablished in 1835, but the Ottomans only
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controlled a few towns in the south for the purposes of
trade oversight. By the start of the twentieth century,
Ottoman authority was notional rather than effective
in this region.
The Italian invasion in 1911 set off a long period of
war and revolt within the country until it was finally
conquered in the early 1930s. The period of Italian rule
was an economic disaster marked by frequent revolts
and a net reduction in the population.
After the Second World War, some attempted to
create an independent Cyrenaica, but Libya emerged
as a unitary state under a constitutional monarchy in
1951. Initially the regime was pro-Western, allowing
substantial US, French, and British military bases,
and it stayed out of the various Arab-Israeli wars in
the 1950s and 1960s. But the country had also become
reliant on Egypt for technical aid and experienced
professional workers, which resulted in a growth in
support for Nasser’s brand of Arab socialism.
The resulting military coup in 1969 brought
Colonel Gadhafi to power. Initially, this regime
remained pro-Egypt and turned to the Soviet bloc for
aid and weaponry, but, by the mid-1970s, the regime
had broken its links with Egypt and was an unreliable
ally of the Soviets. Combined with a foreign policy
more oriented toward Africa than other Arab states,
the regime was left isolated and seen as a major
regional problem by other Arab countries. Terrorist
attacks organized or funded by the regime also led to
growing conflict with the United States in the 1980s.
In the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein,
Gadhafi offered to stop developing chemical and
nuclear weapons and to cooperate with Western
powers against AQ and linked groups. The Libyans
provided close intelligence cooperation, primarily
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aimed at members of the LIFG. The new political
relationship was emphasized, with visits to Libya by
the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the French
President Nicolas Sarkozy. Domestically, the regime
remained repressive, which led to a major revolt
as part of the wider Arab Spring in 2011. Gadhafi’s
regime fell in 2011, and he was killed in Libya in 2012.
His sons fled into exile or were arrested or killed. Since
then, Libya has been plagued by conflict between
several power centers and Islamist militias, including
ISIS and AQ.
Islam in Libya
Islam arrived in Libya in the seventh century with
the wave of Arab conquests in North Africa, and was
initially limited to the coastal cities. The inland tribes
retained their pagan beliefs before converting in the
eleventh century. Some elements of the old belief
systems were retained well into the twentieth century,
including, in places, a matriarchal social system.10
Libyan Islam was overwhelmingly Sunni, but split into
different strands. Although a relatively austere strand
of Sunni jurisprudence dominated, Sufism retained a
strong grip and, to some extent, fused with pre-Islamic
beliefs. Libya was affected by the wider Islamic revival
in the nineteenth century when the Sufi-influenced
Sanusiyah movement came to prominence. This
movement had close links with a similar form of Islam
in the Sudan and shared an opposition to the growing
Western colonial interests (which were often linked to
the spread of Christianity).
The Sanusiyah movement was concentrated in
Cyrenaica. Although the movement promoted an
10.

Ahmida, Making of Modern Libya.
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austere form of Islam and called for a return to the
purity of early Islam, it also rejected the sectarian
approach of the emerging Wahhabi doctrine in
Arabia.11 As had happened earlier in Sudan, this new
strand of Islam fused with nationalist sentiment and
became a source of national dissent first aimed at
Ottoman rule and, later, against Italian colonial rule.
The Sanusiyah movement also sought to challenge
the perceived French sponsorship of Christianity
across the Saharan region, as this was believed to be a
prelude to the imposition of colonial rule.
Demographics
At the end of the nineteenth century, the
population of Libya was around 1.6 million, mostly
concentrated in the coastal cities, and largely of Arab
or Berber descent. The exception was a substantial
Tuareg minority in the south. The long war with
Italy, followed by the brutal occupation, reduced the
country’s population to around 861,000 in 1940. As
a result of a policy of encouraging migration from
Italy during the occupation, about 12 percent of the
remaining population in 1940 was Italian, and of the
rest, almost all were Arab or Berber.
After World War II almost all Italians left the
country, but Libya’s population still increased
fivefold, from 1.13 million people in the late 1950s
to 5.8 million people in 2006, mainly as a result of
the granting of citizenship to Palestinian, Tunisian,
and Egyptian immigrant workers. Some of these
workers arrived to staff the new civil administration
and education systems created in the 1950s, but most
came after the expansion of the oil and gas industries
11.

Ibrahim, Radical Origins.

11

in the 1960s. Although estimates indicate 3 percent
of the population by 2011 was foreign workers, in
reality, first- and second-generation migrants who
have already been granted citizenship make up a
substantial portion of the population.
These arrivals changed the demographics of
Libya and affected domestic politics. Many teachers
and university lecturers arrived from Egypt and
brought with them support for Nasser’s forms of Arab
socialism and nationalism.12 This shift in views had
consequences when the Libyan government chose
neutrality during the 1967 Six-Day War. Rioting broke
out in Benghazi and Tripoli, with attacks on the US
and United Kingdom (UK) embassies and the Libyan
Jewish community. This neutrality added to growing
complaints about both corruption and perceived proCyrenaica policies, creating a substantial movement
increasingly opposed to the monarchy.
The dramatic population increase had significant
effects on Libyan politics and its tribal influences.
Many Libyan nationals are now first- or secondgeneration immigrants who have retained dual
nationality or have close family members living in
nearby countries. These dual nationals were among
those most attractive to AQ and ISIS because of their
ability to cross borders and readily return to their other
country. This mobility, along with the relative loss of
control over Libya’s borders, provided the means for
groups like ISIS to send its militants throughout North
Africa in pursuit of its wider goals.

12. Gerasimos Tsourapas, The Politics of Egyptian Migration
to Libya (Tacoma, WA: Middle East Research and Information
Project, March 17, 2015).
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Early Modern History
Coastal Libya was briefly occupied by Ottoman
troops in the early seventeenth century, reasserting
Ottoman control. But this direct control did not last
long, and a revolt saw formal Ottoman influence
significantly diminished. A new ruler, Ahmed
Karamanli, took control and opted to accept some
degree of Ottoman protection, declaring himself the
pasha of Tripoli in 1722. He and his sons managed
to take control of the main towns and trading routes
to the south. In the search for revenues, he and his
successors deliberately sponsored piracy in the central
Mediterranean region, extorting protection money
from other nations in exchange for not raiding their
ships. These acts led to war with the United States in
1801–5, which ended with the United States paying a
ransom for its captured sailors.13
The end of the Napoleonic Wars brought the
renewed attention of outside powers to the problem
of piracy. The British sent a fleet to force the release of
Christian slaves in 1816 and, by 1820, the British and
French had ended the payment of protection money.
The loss of revenues from piracy, combined with the
need to pay debts imposed by the British and French,
led to a series of revolts within Libya.
In response, the Ottomans intervened, overthrew
the king, and restored direct rule in 1835. The
renewal of direct Ottoman rule was beneficial for
coastal Libya. Ottoman approaches to jurisprudence,
administration, and education were introduced,
and slavery was abolished in 1889. By the 1880s the
13. Khalil Matar and Robert W. Thabit, Lockerbie and Libya:
A Study in International Relations (Jefferson, NC: McFarland &
Company, 2003).
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economy had declined, as trans-Saharan trade routes
were interrupted and agriculture in Tripolitania faced
a prolonged drought. In addition, the weakening
leadership of the Ottoman Empire and growing
unrest across its wider territory meant Libya became a
backwater nation, forced to spend most of the locally
raised revenues on the military (see table 1), at a time
when military demands were increasing.
Table 1. Ottoman state expenditures in Libya, 188114
Type of Expenditure

Amount (in Piasters)

Interior department
Finance department
Religious courts
Justice department
Education
Other salaries
Quarantine office
Postal office
Military

998,600
468,202
99,840
946,188
31,396
409,236
1,200
103,190
6,785,140

The need for a substantial military presence to
hold onto the main cities in the south created a major
problem. Despite growing wealth, keeping up with
the increased costs was difficult for the Ottomans
and, as a consequence, they ended the practice of
exempting foreigners from taxation in 1902. See table 2
for a breakdown of tax categories. The revenues of the
province were significantly greater than in the decades
before, but so were the costs.
14.

Ahmida, Making of Modern Libya, 58.
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Table 2. Ottoman state revenues from Libya,
1881 and 190615
1881 (in Piasters)

1906 (in
Piasters)

150,025
5,000,000
43,350
―
―

478,428
11,291,858
241,748
9,104,088
79,770

Income from
state property

―

14,000

Court fees

―

147,874

Types of Taxes
Livestock
Production
Military
Property
Profit

Over a 25-year period, the Ottomans expanded
manufacturing to the point where it became the
dominant source of state revenues in Libya and
introduced an effective system of property taxation.
From 1900 to 1951
The decision to tax foreigners specifically
affected Italy because the Bank of Rome had actively
encouraged Italian settlement and the buying of land.
The Italians invaded in 1911 and faced substantial
resistance as the Young Turk regime then in power in
Istanbul sent money and weapons to the local rebels.
The Sanusiyah movement galvanized the people and
ensured resistance to the Italian occupation was both
nationalist and religious. As a result, Italian gains in
Libya were initially limited, and by April 1915, Italy
15.
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had suffered a major defeat to the rebels in the Battle
of Qasr bu Hadi.
Encouraged by their Ottoman backers, the rebels
then attacked British-occupied Egypt upon Turkey’s
entrance into the Great War. The invasion was soundly
defeated in 1916, resulting in an accord between the
British and the Sanusis to end the expedition. By
1918, the Libyans had effectively defeated the Italian
invasion. A Libyan Republic was proclaimed in
November 1918, followed by a peace treaty with Italy
in April 1919. The deal recognized the head of the
Sanusis, Idris I, as ruler of Cyrenaica and the south.
This deal led to a civil war, partly on regional lines
and partly because of the religious divisions between
the Sanusis and the other forms of Islam. In the end,
Idris notionally became ruler of Libya, but his hold on
power was short-lived.16
Citing the need to protect its citizens and
commercial interests, Italy deployed troops to Libya
and reoccupied the city of Misratah in January 1922.
Once Mussolini had established his fascist regime
in Rome later that year, one of his first acts was to
discard the 1919 peace treaty and expand the Italian
occupation into a full-scale invasion of Libya. Again,
the Italians made slow gains. The Libyans set aside
their differences to form a united front in 1924 and
waged both a guerrilla and a conventional war. By
1930, the Italians took Fezzan, and by late 1931, they
had defeated the last organized Libyan army. Pietro
Badoglio, the Italian governor, declared Libya an
Italian province in January 1932.
The result was disastrous for the local population.
The Italians removed all civil rights from the native
16. John Wright, Libya: A Modern History (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1982).
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population, placed rebellious tribes into prison camps,
and starved thousands of the rebels to death. At the
same time, land was appropriated for the new Italian
colonists as the Italian population of Libya increased
from 50,000 in 1934 to 90,000 in 1939.
When Italy entered World War II alongside
Germany, the British made full use of their existing
contacts with the Sanusiyah hierarchy to offer Libya
postwar independence. The fighting in Libya from
1940 to 1943 added to its economic problems, leaving
all major ports badly damaged and the countryside
littered with mines. The destruction was particularly
bad in Cyrenaica around Tobruk and Benghazi, while
Tripolitania suffered relatively little war damage.
The British imposed military rule in Cyrenaica after
the Axis retreat, while Tripolitania gained a greater
degree of local autonomy. Cyrenaica attempted to
gain its independence from the British and the rest of
Libya twice between 1945 and 1949. At the same time,
Tripolitania was run by the nationalist party, which
had no influence in the eastern region. Fezzan in the
south had its own political party and was under French
control. Because of the political fractures in Libya, the
UN was initially unwilling to sanction independence,
but agreed to do so in 1950 due to increased pressure
and a lack of viable alternatives.
From 1951 to 1969
Independence
In 1951, Libya became an independent kingdom
based around the three provinces of Tripolitania,
Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. The new state was created as
a hereditary monarchy with Islam as the state religion.
17

The monarchy was liberal and allowed freedom of
worship, a focus on individual freedoms, and an open
approach to granting Libyan citizenship, which could
be acquired by anyone who lived in the country for
at least 10 years. Initially, the state was governed on
a federal basis to reflect the historical divisions within
the country, but was reorganized into 10 provinces
in 1963. The constitutional document from that
reorganization has since been suggested as a form
of governance for the post-Gadhafi state, even if the
actual monarchy is not restored.17
After gaining independence, the economy remained
weak and Libya became reliant on substantial foreign
aid. Both Britain and the United States supported
Libya while operating several military bases in the
country in exchange.18 Libya generally avoided close
involvement with the Soviet Union and remained
neutral during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
Oil and Gas
The Libyan oil and gas fields exist in three main
clusters. The bulk of the fields are to the east of Sirte in
Cyrenaica, a large group exists to the south of Tripoli,
and a final group is located in the far south, west
of Murzuq.19
17. Ali Cheaib, “Libya Foreign Minister Calls for Return of
Monarchy,” Al-Monitor, April 7, 2014, https://www.al-monitor
.com/pulse/politics/2014/04/libya-foreign-minister-interview
-return-monarchy.html.
18. Matar and Thabit, Lockerbie and Libya.
19. Neil Thompson, “Libyan Oil: A Bittersweet
Return?,” Foreign Policy Blogs, December 24, 2016, https://
foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/12/24libyan-oil-bittersweet
-return/.
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Libya had been suspected to have substantial oil
reserves since the end of the nineteenth century, but
the sites could not be explored or exploited with the
technology available at the time. After World War
II, oil exploration by mostly US, French, and British
companies commenced, and reserves were found close
to the Algerian border in 1955. The Libyan government
established a system where the state took 50 percent
of any profits, in addition to a 12.5-percent royalty on
revenues.20 The closure of the Suez Canal after 1956
and the existence of the perceived stable, pro-Western
government led to substantial exploration along the
Algerian border. By 1960, the reserves in the west were
under development, and pipeline and port facilities
had been constructed at Marsa al Burayqah and As
Sidra. A larger terminal was constructed at Marsa al
Hariqah near Tripoli in 1967.
An immediate advantage for Libya was that
Libyan oil is a relatively light crude, meaning it needs
little refining to produce consumable products. In
1969, annual oil production was about three million
barrels a day, yielding substantial revenues and giving
Libya the highest gross domestic product per capita in
Africa. Although the monarchy was not particularly
corrupt and allocated a substantial amount of the new
revenues to social, health, and educational programs,
too little of this new wealth reached ordinary people.
The inequitable distribution of this wealth created
discontent among the growing professional and
middle class. Coupled with the pro-Nasser nationalist
politics of the people, this substantial political
dissent led to the 1969 military coup that brought
Gadhafi to power.
20. Ramadan Aburawi, “Half a Century of Oil in Libya,”
GEOExPro 6, no. 1 (2009).
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The new regime nationalized the oil industry in
1970, and exports dropped to two million barrels a day
within two years. In the aftermath of the 1973 Yom
Kippur War, Libya joined the wider Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries plan to reduce oil
sales, and production fell further to 1.5 million barrels
a day. Libya’s growing international isolation linked
to its sponsorship of international terrorism further
reduced exports to just over one million barrels a
day in 1988. Production partly recovered by the mid1990s to 1.4 million barrels a day, and then began to
expand steadily once Gadhafi announced the end of
his program to develop weapons of mass destruction
and handed the accused perpetrators of the Lockerbie
bombing over for trial in The Hague. After 2003,
foreign investment began to pour into the country
to improve Libya’s antiquated production and
transport systems.21
By 2011, just before Gadhafi’s fall, oil production
was about 1.6 million barrels a day, and production
of natural gas was just under 17 billion cubic meters
per annum.22 Libya had proven reserves of 48 billion
barrels of oil and 1.539 trillion cubic meters of natural
gas.23 Some experts also believe the complex geology
of Libya means substantial, additional reserves exist to
the south of Benghazi that have not been detected.24
The regime exercised control over oil and
gas revenues in four ways. First, Libya’s foreign
21. Waniss Otman and Erling Karlberg, The Libyan Economy:
Economic Diversification and International Repositioning (Berlin:
Springer, 2007).
22. “Libya Natural Gas—Production,” Index Mundi, last
updated December 7, 2019, https://www.indexmundi.com/libya
/natural_gas_production.html.
23. “Libya Natural Gas.”
24. Aburawi, “Oil in Libya.”
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investments improved as the regime sought to create
an oil fund and remove assets from the country.
Second, the country began substantial funding of its
engagements in Africa and international terrorism.
Third, the regime continued the policy the old
monarchy had upheld of transferring some of the
wealth into domestic social, educational, and health
programs. Finally, Gadhafi and his immediate family
and inner circle ensured a substantial sum was moved
into their private bank accounts.25 One estimate
speculates the regime’s corruption removed $120
billion from the economy and invested the funds in
European and Middle Eastern banks.26
From 2003 onwards, the regime also invested in
improving its reputation in Western Europe, offering
help to Italy after the 2009 earthquake at L’Aquila and
investing in British universities such as the London
School of Economics.27 The regime purchased a stake
in the Italian football club Juventus, as ties with
Italy had improved after the United States imposed
sanctions in 1982. In return, access to Libya’s oil and
gas reserves was granted to oil companies associated
with perceived friendly regimes.

25. Tom Bawden and John Hooper, “Gaddafis’ Hidden
Billions: Dubai Banks, Plush London Pads and Italian Water,”
Guardian, February 22, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com
/world/2011/feb/22/gaddafi-libya-oil-wealth-portfolio.
26. Bawden and Hooper, “Gaddafis’ Hidden Billions.”
27. Graeme Paton and Steven Swinford, “Libya: LSE Feared
‘Embarrassing’ Gaddafi’s Son over Donation,” Daily Telegraph,
March 5, 2011, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/africaandindianocean/libya/8362602/Libya-LSE-feared
-embarrassing-Gaddafis-son-over-donation.html.
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Gadhafi
A military coup in 1969 ushered in Gadhafi’s
Libyan Arab Republic.28 For practical purposes, the
regime was profoundly authoritarian. The regime
silenced domestic dissent and was prepared to attack
its perceived enemies when they were abroad. But,
in terms of wider trends, the regime shifted focus
three times.
• Until 1974, the regime could be considered Nasserist; it had the ostensible goal of union with
Egypt and had sent a military contingent to
help Egypt during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.29
• From 1974 to 2003, the regime was isolated
within the wider Arab world and focused
mostly on Africa and sponsoring a variety of
international terrorist groups.30
• From 2003 through 2011, the regime found
common ground with the United States, the
United Kingdom, and other NATO countries
by conflating its domestic opposition with
the international struggle against AQ, ending
its embryonic attempt to gain weapons of
mass destruction, and increasingly welcoming international investment and a parade of
Western leaders.31

28. Anna Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation: Colonial
Legacy, Exile and the Emergence of a New Nation-State (London:
Taylor and Francis, 2014).
29. Matar and Thabit, Lockerbie and Libya.
30. Baldinetti, Origins of the Libyan Nation.
31. Flynt L. Leverett, “Why Libya Gave up on the Bomb,”
Brookings, January 23, 2004, https://www.brookings.edu
/opinions/why-libya-gave-up-on-the-bomb/.
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Despite this shift in international orientation,
some common themes emerged. The underlying
orientation of Gadhafi’s regime was toward his own
version of socialism. When the US and UK military
bases were closed, the regime adopted a broadly proSoviet foreign policy while avoiding close links with
the Soviets and having to accept Soviet technicians
for its military purchases. Although the regime had
notionally nationalized the oil industry, in reality this
was an extreme version of the monarchy’s practice
of handing out exploration and exploitation licenses
for five-year blocks and reassigning such licenses
among competing providers. This practice gave the
regime considerable discretion over the parties that
were allowed to operate in the country, and US and
European companies continued to operate in Libya up
to the early 1980s, and again after 2003. An important
part of the regime’s approach to international
business was to use oil and access to it as a lever for
political advantage and as a source of bribes for those
in power.32
Domestic Opposition
Initially, the Gadhafi regime faced little organized
domestic opposition and probably had the passive
support of most of the population. Oil revenues
enabled investments in social provision, education,
and health, as well as the development of the
infrastructure of major cities. The regime projected a
veneer of democracy to help minimize dissent.
Initially, the opposition fell into two groups.
Supporters of the monarchy mostly fled into exile,
but retained some presence in Cyrenaica, where the
32.
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monarchy had always been more popular. A second
group included individuals who had fallen out with
Gadhafi and in turn were often murdered or forced
into exile. Supporters of the old regime and people
who had been alienated from the new regime were
weak within Libya and mainly existed among the
wider Libyan diaspora.
Within Libya, the most effective domestic
opposition to Gadhafi’s regime from the 1980s onward
came from Islamist-orientated organizations. The
various Islamist groups either organized themselves
as the LIFG or remained organizationally close to the
Muslim Brotherhood. The latter retained substantial
support in the region around Tripoli and reemerged
as the Libya Dawn militia organization after
Gadhafi’s fall.
The LIFG had its roots in supporters of the Islamist
Sanusiyah movement. The LIFG’s ideology was based
on the purification of Islam and the removal of Western
influences, giving it some ideological overlap with the
Salafi ideology of AQ.33 But these links were tenuous,
as the LIFG’s focus was on the governance of Libya,
not global jihad.34 Nonetheless, many individuals who
were to become prominent in the LIFG had fled Libya
in the 1980s and fought the Soviets with other jihadists
in Afghanistan. In that country the LIFG made links
with the emerging AQ and the wider doctrines of
Salafi jihadism.35
Returning to Libya in the early 1990s, the LIFG
first tried to build up its base in Benghazi and eastern
33. CISAC,
“Libyan
Islamic
Fighting
Group,”
Stanford, updated July 2018, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/
mappingmilitants/profiles/libyan-islamic-fighting-group.
34. Library of Congress, Al-Qaeda in Libya.
35. Ibrahim, Radical Origins.
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Libya. The LIFG commenced its campaign of armed
resistance in 1995 and attempted to assassinate
Gadhafi in 1996.36 This attack may have been funded
by British intelligence, as the United Kingdom sought
revenge on Gadhafi for the killing of a British police
officer in 1984 and Libyan funding for the Irish
Republican Army.37 British support for LIFG was to
prove transitory and, by the mid-2000s, the United
Kingdom began to arrest and transfer LIFG militants
back to Gadhafi’s jails.38
Regardless of the source of funding, the
assassination attempt provoked a round of repression
and further violence, prompting the LIFG to send
potential fighters to Sudan for training that used AQ
bases. Further repression by the government meant
that by 2000, most of the LIFG’s membership was in
exile; as a result, militants either joined AQ affiliates or
worked directly with AQ during this period. The LIFG
kept its distance from AQ, mainly because the former
believed nothing would come from attacking the West
when its sworn enemy was Gadhafi.39 The LIFG did
not back various AQ actions, such as the bombing
of the USS Cole in 1998, and apparently warned AQ
against attacking the US mainland in 2001.40
In 2007, the Gadhafi regime attempted to dampen
domestic opposition by releasing some members of
militant opposition groups, including the LIFG. In
36. CISAC, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.”
37. Gary Gambill, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
(LIFG),” Jamestown, May 5, 2005, https://jamestown.org/program
/the-libyan-islamic-fighting-group-lifg/.
38. John C. K. Daly, “Libya and Al-Qaeda: A Complex
Relationship,” Jamestown, May 5, 2005, https://jamestown.org
/program/libya-and-al-qaeda-a-complex-relationship/.
39. Library of Congress, Al-Qaeda in Libya.
40. CISAC, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.”
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2009, the LIFG’s imprisoned leadership broke fully
with AQ’s ideology and announced “that the use of
violence as a means of overthrowing governments
in Muslim countries was illegal from an Islamic
point of view,” marking a substantial break from
the normal ideology of Salafi-jihadist groups.41 This
break was significant because the LIFG was well
respected in wider jihadist circles, and it marked a
final organizational and ideological split with AQ.
The LIFG formally disbanded in 2010, though it has
been suggested many militants joined the Libyan
Islamic Movement based around Tripoli in 2011 or the
emerging AQ network in the country.
Until 2003, the LIFG had attracted little attention
outside Libya.42 Even in exile, its militants did not seek
to attack the West, and the group’s relative distance
from the core of AQ meant the LIFG was not an
immediate target of Western intelligence services. To
some extent, the group gained a degree of tolerance
from foreign intelligence services because it was an
enemy of the Gadhafi regime.
After the US-led invasion of Iraq, Gadhafi
announced he would abandon his attempts to
produce chemical and nuclear weapons.43 The reward
was a lifting of UN sanctions and slowly increasing
amounts of foreign investment, primarily in Libya’s
oil industry. A secondary consequence was the British,
in particular, started to arrest exiled members of the

41. Library of Congress, Al-Qaeda in Libya, 9; and Ibrahim,
Radical Origins.
42. Daly, “Libya and Al-Qaeda.”
43. Leverett, “Why Libya Gave up.”
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LIFG and return them to Libya.44 Some experts have
suggested this created an opening for AQ to establish
itself in Libya as the LIFG fragmented and lost its
leadership.45
Foreign Policy: The Arab World
In many ways, the regime was more notable for
its shifts in international relations than its domestic
policy. At first, reflecting the Nasserist base of much
of its support, the regime sought to reinforce its proEgypt leanings by sending troops to help Egypt in the
1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel. This improvement
foundered as Anwar Sadat moved toward
rapprochement with Israel. Relations worsened
between Libya and Egypt as the two countries came
close to war in 1974 and ended up in open conflict in
1977. In response, first Sadat and then Hosni Mubarak
reduced the level of Egyptian support to Libya (in
particular of teachers) as they sought to isolate a
regime they thought was out of control.46
Relations also suffered with Libyan neighbor
Tunisia, which feared aggression and acts of statesponsored terrorism and wished to retain its proFrance policies. As a result of Libyan actions, the
mainstream elements of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization avoided any public engagement
44. Peter Taylor, “UK Government ‘Approved Abdel Hakim
Belhaj’s Rendition,’” BBC, April 9, 2012, https://www.bbc.com
/news/uk-17651797.
45. Ian Cobain, “MI5 Says Rendition of Libyan Opposition
Leaders Strengthened Al-Qaida,” Guardian, January 29, 2015,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/29/mi5
-rendition-libyan-oppostion-strengthened-al-qaida.
46. Tsourapas, The Politics of Egyptian Migration; and Matar
and Thabit, Lockerbie and Libya.
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with Libya, especially after the regime started to
fund, support, and use a shifting coalition of small,
extremist Palestinian groups as part of its sponsorship
of international terrorism.
Despite the opposition, Gadhafi continued
pursuing various unity schemes; these included
attempts to forge close links with the pro-Western
states in northwest Africa and with Syria. Attempts
at establishing a political union with Syria failed, but
the shared distaste for Egyptian policy toward Israel
by the two regimes and their anti-Western ideology
meant close links with the Hafiz al-Assad regime were
established and sustained.
Foreign Policy: Africa
Libya’s relative isolation in the Arab world seemed
to have little effect on the regime as it then chose to
emphasize its Berber and Tuareg roots rather than
see itself as a particularly Arabic state. The regime’s
international focus then turned to concentrate on
building relations with other African nations.
A major effort of this African focus was to lead
the creation of the African Union (AU) in 1999 as a
successor body to the Organization for African Unity.47
Over the next 12 years, Libya was the main financial
backer of the AU. This support, added to direct
47. Robert Nolan, “The African Union after Gaddafi,”
Journal of Diplomacy (blog), Journal of Diplomacy and
International Relations, December 5, 2011, http://blogs.shu.edu
/journalofdiplomacy/2011/12/the-african-union-after
-gaddafi/; and Karen MacGregor, “Gaddafi Muscles in on Mbeki’s
Big Day as African Union Struggles into Being,” Independent,
July 9, 2002, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world
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investment in other African states, may have totaled
as much as $150 billion. Gadhafi in particular pushed
the AU to support the idea of a single state covering
the whole of Africa. As a result of his support, the AU
made several attempts to intervene during the Libyan
civil war to prop up the Gadhafi regime and call for a
cease-fire.
But Gadhafi was not just content to bankroll the AU
and issue rallying calls for pan-Africanism. His regime
also intervened directly; this included sending troops
to sustain Idi Amin’s dictatorship in Uganda between
1972 and 1979 and a series of military interventions in
other North African states.48 Libyan actions included
support for the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army
in the 1970s, a direct invasion of Chad starting in
the 1970s, providing training for terrorist groups
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and backing a Tuareg
rebellion in Mali. These actions, combined with antiAfrican riots in Tripoli in 2000, left Gadhafi partly
isolated, reliant on the support of other dictators like
Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, and shunned by the
more democratic states.
The poor relations with other nations had longterm consequences. In revenge for Libya’s earlier
backing of Islamist rebels and calling for Nigeria’s
partition, Nigeria voted with other members of the
UN Security Council to support NATO’s intervention
in the Libyan civil war, although other AU leaders
maintained their traditional opposition to any attempt

48. Adekeye Adebajo, “Gaddafi: The Man Who
Would Be King of Africa,” Guardian, August 26, 2011,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011
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by outsiders to intervene in the internal affairs of a
member state.49
In the end, Gadhafi’s attempts to position himself
as a lead player in African politics failed for several
reasons. His clear preference for dictatorial over
democratic regimes meant many states were cautious,
especially when this was linked to his support for
various extremist rebellions. Equally, his positioning
of Libya as a Berber-Tuareg state led to racist attacks
on black African workers and migrants as well as a
loss of support among the Christian groups and states
in sub-Saharan Africa. But his substantial funding of
the AU meant he remained an important figure and,
indirectly, the West gained from this. Libyan largesse
allowed AU peacekeeping missions that have been
important in Somalia, Burundi, and sub-Saharan
Africa in dealing with various Islamist insurgencies.
The links forged in the Gadhafi era matter now,
especially as ISIS in Libya looks to recover from its
setbacks. The old regime had a long history of using
the porous borders in the Sahara to send money,
weapons, and fighters to fuel conflicts. Gadhafi also
had close links to a range of violent groups engaged
in conflicts across North and Central Africa. The
regime externally had sought out and funded a range
of Islamic groups engaged in localized disputes with
their respective states.
International Terrorism
To many Western powers, the main reason the
Gadhafi regime was problematic was its continued
support for international terrorism. This support
involved the killing of exiled Libyans by the regime
49.
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in various Western countries and meant direct attacks
on Western powers. The latter became more prevalent
in the 1980s as Libya started to challenge the West
more directly. Various terrorist acts were attributed
to the regime, including the shooting of a British
police officer in 1984, the bombing of a discotheque
used by US servicemembers in Berlin in 1986, and
the destruction of a Pan Am airplane over Scotland in
1988 and a French plane over Niger in 1989.50
At the same time, the Libyans and the United States
engaged in open military conflict in the Gulf of Sidra,
which the Libyans claimed as territorial waters.51
Some of the terrorist attacks in Europe were probably
in revenge for Libyan losses in this dispute, as well
as for US acts of retaliation, such as the bombing
raids in 1986.
Libya started to fund terrorist groups active
in NATO countries, notably sending arms and
funding to the Irish Republican Army in Northern
Ireland and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain.52 In
line with the regime’s support for the most extreme
Palestinian groups, the regime may have sent
support and provided training camps to groups such
as the German Red Army Faction and the Italian
Red Brigades. Since the latter also had close links to
groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of
50. Simon Tisdall, “Gaddafi: A Vicious, Sinister Despot Driven
out on Tidal Wave of Hatred,” Guardian, August 23, 2011, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/23/libya-gaddafi
-vicious-despot.
51. David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, Qaddafi and the Libyan
Revolution (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987).
52. House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee,
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Commons, May 2, 2017).
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Palestine—General Command, support may have
been provided using that connection.53 The regime
may have also sent weapons and money to groups as
diverse as the FARC in Colombia and Islamist rebels
in the Philippines.54
Shifting Relations with Europe
From 1970 to 2000, the Gadhafi regime either
carried out acts of terrorism or funded international
terrorist groups in almost every major Western
European power. Although this terrorist activity
clearly led to tensions, it did not lead to a cessation of
relations, mainly related to the West’s desire to access
Libyan oil.55
Italy, for example, imported almost 22 percent
of its oil from Libya in the late 1960s and the state
oil firm, Eni, continued to operate in the country
even after Gadhafi had expelled the final remnants
of the colonial-era Italian population in 1970. When
US and British oil firms lost their licenses after the
1986 US-led air attacks, Eni stepped in to expand its
holdings and Gadhafi continued to use oil exploitation
contracts to reward international allies and ensure the
development of Libya’s reserves.56 But when Silvio
53. CISAC, “Red Brigades,” Stanford, updated June 20,
2012, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles
/red-brigades.
54. “Colombian President Claims Gaddafi Supported FARC
with Money,” MercoPress, October 24, 2011, https://en.mercopress
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Berlusconi came to power in 1994, Italy radically
expanded its ties with the regime.57 Over the next
decade, Libya invested heavily in the Italian stock
market; bought 7.5 percent of UniCredit, the country’s
largest bank; and bought a large share in the Juventus
football club. At the same time, Berlusconi was happy
to welcome Gadhafi as an honored guest.
France was also reliant on Libya for oil (16 percent
of its imports in 2011 came from Libya), but generally
refrained from closer links. The French posture toward
Libya changed when Sarkozy became president.
French arms sales to the regime grew, leading to a
flurry of state visits and declarations of public support.
Other European countries were more circumspect.
Germany and others relied on Libyan oil very little and
showed little interest in developing closer relations.
Others, such as the United Kingdom, suffered directly
from Gadhafi’s sponsorship of terrorism, but after
Gadhafi renounced weapons of mass destruction in
2003, the British government started to support the
regime. The United Kingdom was prepared to arrest
and deport Gadhafi’s opponents and sell arms in
return for lucrative oil deals. The oil and gas company
BP benefited notably by being awarded a $900-million
exploration and development contract after 2006.58 But
both France and Britain turned on the regime after the
Libya revolt of 2011 and have since sought to ensure
their commercial interests in the aftermath of the
revolution.
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Shifting Relations with the United States
Like the United Kingdom, the United States had a
difficult relationship with the Gadhafi regime. Until
1986, US oil companies continued to operate in the
country, even after Libya had been designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. A trade embargo
was put in place in 1986, which led to the regime
canceling all US exploration rights. The embargo
lasted until 2004, when US President George W. Bush
repealed the sanctions. Soon afterwards, Exxon signed
a major contract to exploit Libya’s offshore oil deposits,
but, overall, US business interests in Libya remained
limited when compared to British and French
business interests.
THE FALL OF GADHAFI AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES
Gadhafi’s improving international image did
not remove domestic dissent. In 2006, a short-lived
military coup in Benghazi occurred, and in 2008 and
2010, riots occurred over corruption and reduced
living standards. And despite the repression of the
Muslim Brotherhood and the LIFG, both managed to
retain a presence in Libya, providing the opposition
with an organizational base that was to prove essential
when open revolt broke out in 2011.
Civil War
In February 2011, a major revolt broke out and
the eastern regions, especially Benghazi, overthrew
their local governors. Following a UN Security
Council decision to freeze Gadhafi’s assets and an
Anglo-French intervention, the revolt spread across
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the country, leading to the collapse of the regime
by August 2011.59 Unfortunately, failure to plan for
the postconflict phase meant the country has since
fractured on geographical and tribal lines, despite
multiple attempts to mediate a solution.60
Although placing the Libyan revolt in the context of
the wider Arab Spring of 2011 is common, the reasons
for the rebellion were essentially local and related to
the regime’s corruption and domestic policies.61 The
revolt also quickly took on a regional characteristic
as it started in Benghazi in February 2011 and spread
across the country. In response, those Western powers
that had, until recently, courted Gadhafi removed
their support. The UN Security Council imposed
sanctions on the regime’s elite and referred members
of the regime to the International Criminal Court.
As the fighting spread, the UN created a no-fly zone
and authorized member states to use all necessary
measures to prevent further attacks on civilians.
Briefly, the regime seemed to regain control,
especially of Tripoli at the end of February, and offered
a cease-fire partly mediated by the AU. At the same
time, violence against the civilian population escalated,
and by early March, the regime seemed as though it
might win the immediate military struggle. A NATOled intervention halted a pro-government offensive
toward Benghazi, and an uneasy international
coalition maintained both a no-fly zone (under NATO
control) and ground strikes on Gadhafi’s forces (under
59. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Libya.
60. Blanchard, Libya.
61. Larbi Sadiki, “The Arab Spring: The ‘People’ in
International Relations,” in International Relations of the Middle
East, ed. Louise Fawcett (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2017), 324.
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the control of a wider international coalition that
included some NATO members and air units from the
Gulf Cooperation Council states).
The leadership of the Transitional National Council
was acknowledged as the legitimate representative
of the Libyan people in May 2011 by various states,
including the United Kingdom and the United States,
and by Turkey in July 2011. The regime made several
offers of a cease-fire and a peaceful transition, yet
NATO and its allies escalated its campaign by sending
some ground troops and dropping weapons and
supplies to rebel areas. Tripoli fell to the rebels on
August 21–22, and by September 22, only Sirte, Bani
Walid, and Al Fuqaha remained under regime control.
Gadhafi was killed on October 20, 2011, after his forces
lost control of Sirte.
The end of the regime did not bring peace. Due to
disinterest and poor planning, the Western powers
did little to restore governance, and the country
fragmented into small areas held by various local
militias.62 In places, a single group ran a town, but
Tripoli was effectively under the control of several
competing groups as well as the remnants of Gadhafi’s
supporters. By 2013, militias controlled the various oil
refineries and were selling oil on the black market as
production dropped from 1.4 million barrels a day
in late 2012 to just 160,000 barrels a day. Benghazi
and Cyrenaica pushed for independence, and US
Ambassador John Christopher Stevens was murdered
in September 2012 at his residence in Benghazi as
62. Patrick Cockburn, “Special Report: We All Thought
Libya Had Moved On—It Has, but into Lawlessness and Ruin,”
Independent, September 3, 2013, https://www.independent.co.uk
/news/world/africa/special-report-we-all-thought-libya-had
-moved-on-it-has-but-into-lawlessness-and-ruin-8797041.html.
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radical Islamists attacked the US embassy to expand
their power.
The Transitional National Council scarcely
survived the fall of Gadhafi as the country splintered
on regional and ethnic lines, with local militias seeking
to secure oil revenues. This chaos created ample space
for insurgent groups like AQ and ISIS to flourish.
Postconflict Governance
After the fall of Gadhafi, Libya splintered along the
lines of its historical subdivisions and according to the
militias or tribal groups that dominated in towns and
regions. By 2015, the GNA was agreed to by the main
factions and included the Tobruk-based HoR, the
Tripoli-based GNC, and the Tripoli-based Libya Dawn
militia groups, which were closely aligned to the
Muslim Brotherhood.63 Although these groups were
notionally committed to this process, progress stalled
over disputes about the jobs and functions that should
be allocated to each group. The HoR is unwilling to
give up its control over the Libyan military, although
groups aligned with the GNC have generally become
more supportive of the GNA process. Equally, the
HoR has de facto control of the regions containing
most of Libya’s oil industry. Additionally, the LNA,
backed by the UAE and Egypt and led by ex-Gadhafi
general Khalifah Haftar, carved out its own area of
control in eastern, central, and southern Libya and
stands outside the GNA framework.
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By late 2017, four groups held power in different
regions of Libya. The notional government, the GNA,
had some power in Tripoli, but this was contested by
both Libya Dawn and smaller militia groups operating
in roughly the same area. The HoR controls the bulk
of the oil industry around Tobruk, and the LNA sits
outside the GNA’s control with a power base in the
east and south. The situation is complicated by the
foreign sponsorship of each faction. Egypt and the
UAE originally backed the HoR and, more recently,
the LNA, while Qatar and Turkey have supported
the GNC and Libya Dawn.64 This international
involvement has led to charges and countercharges
among the various Arab states as to their respective
goals, funding of terrorism, and promotion of the
breakup of Libya.
External Involvement
During the civil war, foreign intervention started
with French, British, and US attacks on Gadhafi’s
troops and was initially designed to stop further
attacks on civilians. Other powers were also involved,
leading to the creation of a wider Libya Contact Group
consisting of the United States, France, Great Britain,
Italy, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. The Libya
Contact Group was used to coordinate air strikes
designed to weaken the regime, a more aggressive
response than required by the UN resolution. Of the
non-NATO members, Qatar and the UAE initially

64. Karim Mezran and Elissa Miller, “With ISIS on
the Brink of Defeat, Is Trump Planning a Surge in Libya?,”
Newsweek, July 13, 2017, https://www.newsweek.com
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provided humanitarian assistance in Benghazi, and
the UAE offered some direct military support.65
Postconflict, the initial response of the Western
powers was to step back and repeat the errors
that marred the Iraq War; this included excessive
optimism about the simplicity of moving from an
authoritarian regime to a stable, representative form
of government.66 Western timidity seemed to be
driven by a desire not to convert military intervention
against the old regime into a long-term commitment
to rebuilding Libya. In many instances, Western policy
was driven by an overly optimistic hope Libya would
transition from dictatorship to something akin to the
limited democracies of some of the Gulf States in a
short period, with the only issue being the allocation
of new business contracts. The enduring problem
of the refugee crisis and the presence of ISIS finally
forced a reengagement, with the main goal of stopping
refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea
into Italy. But in the meantime, postwar Libya had
fragmented.
This fragmentation, as noted, is partly on
geographical lines, partly reflecting an ideological
split between the Muslim Brotherhood and
Sanusiyah-inspired movements and partly reflecting
the conflicts among the various external states now
involved. The dispute between Qatar, the UAE, and
65. Guma El-Gamaty, “Qatar, the UAE and the Libya
Connection” Al-Jazeera, June 12, 2017, https://www
.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/06/qatar-uae-libya
-connection-170612080219306.html.
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Way Out,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2015,
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the Saudis extends beyond the borders of Libya,
adding to the complexity of the situation. The QatariEmirati conflict (with the Saudis backing the UAE)
mirrors similar disputes in Syria and Yemen as well
as tensions between gulf-region powers.67 Adding to
the external forces in the country is the determination
of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s government in Egypt to
prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from establishing a
hold in Libya.
The role of Qatar has been particularly
controversial. Along with other Arab states, Qatar sent
humanitarian aid to help the anti-Gadhafi forces rather
than the military intervention favored by the UAE.68
Even so, Qatar fully backed the rebels, even when
their chances of success seemed limited, and supplied
oil, food, and much-needed medicine to Benghazi in
the aftermath of the uprising in February 2011. Qatar’s
willingness to intervene was welcomed by the NATO
countries involved because it represented substantial
direct assistance at a time when they felt constrained
by the dynamics of the UN Security Council, the
UN mandates, and domestic concerns. According to
a Reuters report, Qatar’s primary goal was to gain
control over the export of Libyan oil and gas and use
this to coordinate with its own production (in effect,
to give Qatar more leverage within the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries).69 But Qatar has
characterized its engagement with the Tripoli-based
67. Simeon Kerr and Katrina Manson, “Trump Points Finger at
Qatar over Terror Financing,” Financial Times, June 7, 2017, https://
www.ft.com/content/995989b6-4a8a-11e7-919a-1e14ce4af89b.
68.
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GNA as backing the peaceful process of helping the
UN-supported government.
The greater dispute between Qatar and the Saudis
has two basic causes. One is Qatar’s willingness
and desire to normalize relations with Iran, with
which it shares some oil fields, rather than the direct
confrontation preferred by Saudis.70 Also, the Qataris
have backed traditional Islamist groups, in particular
the Muslim Brotherhood, at a time when the Saudis,
the UAE, and the new Egyptian regime are determined
to stamp out any emerging brotherhood power base.71
In supporting the GNA, the Qataris have funded
elements within the brotherhood-affiliated Libya
Dawn movement and retained close links with the
Cyrenaica-based HoR.
The Qataris are almost certainly funding Islamist
groups within Libya.72 Qatar has had links with
members of the Islamist LIFG, which had already
publicly repudiated AQ and its basic ideology.73 Qatar
has been accused of doing more than just funding its
proxy factions, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, in
a complex and divided dispute. Qatar has also been
accused of directly funding ISIS in Libya.74 Little
independent evidence of this support has been found,
but some Libyan officials with links to the LNA have
made regular claims Qatar has provided direct funding
70. Zhdannikov et al., “Special Report.”
71. Nicola Pedde, “The Libyan Conflict and Its
Controversial Roots,” European View 16, no. 1 (June 2017), https://
doi.org/10.1007/s12290-017-0447-5.
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and facilitated the transfer of ISIS fighters from Syria to
Libya. Adding to the confusion, US President Donald
Trump recently praised Qatar for tackling the funding
of terrorism only a few months after he endorsed the
Saudi claims Qatar was funding ISIS.75
At an organizational level, a clear distinction
exists between the old LIFG and AQ or ISIS, although
many individuals have shifted loyalty according to
the perceived dominance of each group. Equally,
individual Libyans have been active in many recent
attacks in Western Europe, including attacks in the
United Kingdom in 2016 and 2017. Qatari support for
individuals involved in the local branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood or the LIFG means such individuals are
also funding groups that have close links to people
who have carried out attacks for ISIS. Having links
with ISIS is not the same as directly funding it, but it
does indicate a lack of concern for the consequences of
the group’s dispute with the UAE and the Saudis.
Although the Qatari government might seek to
differentiate between its support for groups aligned
with the Muslim Brotherhood and non-Salafi radical
Islamism, not all private citizens do so. Again, as in
Syria, evidence has been found private individuals
from various gulf countries, including Kuwait, the
UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have funded extremist
groups with their own funds. External involvement,
whether by a state or by rich, private individuals, only
undermines the creation of a competent government
in Libya and leaves open an opportunity for ISIS or
AQ to stage a comeback.
75. Josh Lederman, “Trump Extols Qatar on Anti-Terror,
Reversing Past Critique,” Associated Press, April 10, 2018,
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Politically, the central issue in the UAE-Qatar
dispute (and how it applies to Libya) is support for
the Muslim Brotherhood rather than ISIS. The UAE is
determined to eradicate the group and was quick to
send aid to Egypt after Mohamed Morsi’s overthrow
in 2013.76 Little doubt remains that after it failed to
stop Libya Dawn from seizing Tripoli through air
strikes, the UAE broke the UN arms embargo and
directly armed groups the country believed shared
its concerns.
For example, the UAE backed Egyptian attempts
to bring General Haftar’s LNA to power, including
air strikes on his opponents, despite his opposition to
the UN-backed government. Haftar had served under
Gadhafi until he defected in the late 1980s after the
military defeat in Chad. He is accused by other factions
of seeking to restore the Gadhafi regime, albeit without
the inconvenience of the Gadhafi family. Thus, Qatar
accuses the UAE of seeking to destabilize the country
as part of the UAE’s intention that no Islamist groups
be involved in the government. The UAE and Egypt
are supporting, arming, and funding the only main
faction in Libya that is openly opposed to the GNA.
With its external backing, the LNA became a potent
military force but lacked wider appeal, and its attempt
to capture Tripoli in late 2019 failed.
THE RISE OF ISIS
Al-Qaeda in Libya
After the 2011 civil war, Libya was left without a
functioning government and splintered into small
76.
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units ruled by various tribal and militia groups. Not
surprisingly, AQ sought to exploit the situation.77
The existing links between the LIFG and AQ
are complex. At the level of organization and core
ideology, the two groups differ in important ways,
not least of which is the LIFG drew on the Sanusiyah
movement that had dominated Libya and the Sudan
in the nineteenth century rather than the Saudi-based
Wahhabi and, later, Salafi beliefs.78 At a practical level,
the LIFG leadership did not share AQ’s belief the far
enemy (the United States) was the prime target; LIFG
saw its struggle as one to remove Gadhafi’s regime
and install an Islamist government in Libya.
Nevertheless, ex-members of the LIFG have moved
to join AQ affiliates in other countries, especially as
AQ was creating a network of groups across North
Africa under the rubric of al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghrib.79 This subgroup was formed in 2006 as
part of the evolution of AQ’s strategy after it lost its
bases in Afghanistan and brought together Islamist
groups in Algeria, Morocco, and sub-Saharan Africa.80
Al-Qaeda had originally sought to cooperate with the
LIFG, and although some individuals from the LIFG
worked with AQ, their presence in Libya was limited.
Consequently, prior to 2011, AQ only had a small
network in Libya using the Ansar al-Sharia label.
During and after the uprising, this group operated in
a manner similar to the Syrian group the Al-Nusrah
77. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Libya.
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Front to Protect the Levant. Ansar al-Sharia sought
to cooperate with other Salafi groups sharing key
elements of its ideology, rather than insist on total
acceptance of AQ’s fundamental beliefs.
Estimates suggest by 2012, AQ had some 300
members in Libya spread between Darnah, Sirte, and
Al Kufrah, but with more influence among the other
militias than these raw numbers would imply. By this
stage, AQ probably had absorbed the element of the
LIFG that remained committed to violent jihad. But in
turn, AQ was to be overtaken by a new rival.
ISIS in Libya
The general strategy of AQ after the collapse of
its efforts in Iraq in 2006 was to try to work with the
wider collection of jihadist movements, even if these
movements had significant differences in practical
goals and ideology.81 But ISIS, AQ’s former franchise
in Iraq, drew very different lessons from this defeat
and decided it could tolerate no independent Sunni
movements in territory it controlled. After ISIS rose to
power in northern Iraq and came to dominate much
of northern and eastern Syria by 2014, the group was
seen as the dynamic new leader of global jihad. Along
the way, the group absorbed former AQ networks as
well as individual militants.82 Ironically, a movement
that started by rejecting AQ’s enduring focus on the far
enemy (the United States) in favor of gaining power in
Iraq and Jordan, ISIS became a global movement in its
81. Daniel L. Byman and Jennifer R. Williams, ISIS vs. Al
Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War (Washington, DC: Center for the
National Interest, February 24, 2015).
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own right as it spread from Iraq and came to dominate
the wider Salafi-jihadist movement.83
The Islamic State entered Libya to take full
advantage of the chaos after the revolt of 2011. As in
Syria, the group rejected the option of cooperating
with other Salafi groups and instead tried to impose
its own agenda and organization. The Islamic State’s
enemy was as much other Islamist movements as the
competing government forces.
The UK-based Quilliam think tank translated an
ISIS document that described its initial strategy in
Libya.84 To create a substantial cadre of militants, ISIS
tried to build up its presence in part by stopping the
flow of Libyan fighters to Syria and by fusing with
some local militia groups that were sympathetic to
ISIS’s goals, which were
• treating Libya as a new province of the caliphate;
• easing the pressure on the Syria/Iraq province,
partly because it could reach both into Saharan
Africa and across the Mediterranean; and
• gaining access to military supplies that could
be used to fuel other conflicts, such as the
one in Mali.
Although the ISIS document identified Libya as
an important target, it also suggested the group faced
a limited time frame in which it could consolidate its
control. The Islamic State’s first presence in Libya was
a base in Darnah in January 2013.85 This base was used
83. Peter Beaumont, “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: The ISIS
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for multiple attacks, including the murder of Western
tourists carried out by Tunisians who had returned
home from working in Libya and the beheading of 21
Egyptian Coptic Christians. The latter crime briefly led
to a discussion of joint military action between Egypt
and Italy, but other EU nations and the United States
insisted on diplomatic actions and even maintained
the existing arms embargo on the Libyan government,
leading to the collapse of the Italian-Egyptian
initiative. The EU and the United States were unwilling
to intervene despite ISIS’s provocations because they
feared ISIS would be able to exploit the presence of
Western troops to generate additional support for
its cause.86 Both Britain and France remained overly
optimistic a stable government would be established,
leading to rapid economic development.87
The Islamic State then established a presence in
multiple coastal towns—mostly the same towns AQ
had earlier infiltrated—particularly Sirte. The group
took over the existing AQ network as it had in Syria by
accepting AQ militants who had swapped allegiances.
The overlap of ISIS and AQ from the perspective of
individual militants appears important. Individual
jihadists seem more willing to join the group or local
Salafi organization that is deemed to be the most
successful, so fighting for their version of Islam is far
more important than the exact organization for which
they fight.88 This willingness to join the most successful
organization has important implications for the events
86. Toaldo, “Europe’s Options on Libya.”
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that might occur once ISIS is effectively defeated in a
given territory or region. As long as poor governance,
corruption, and real grievances exist, some form of
extremist jihadist movement will seek to exploit the
situation.
For a period, ISIS was poised to dominate the
country, as the group looked to take advantage of
existing conflicts and imposed its own violent rule
over the territories it controlled. Despite the lack of
a strong Libyan government, ISIS’s grip on Libya
was never as secure as its control over parts of Syria.
One major reason was a lack of local manpower. Few
foreign fighters went to Libya, and most active ISIS
militants were those already based in North Africa or
those with personal connections to Libya.
The Islamic State’s approach led to its isolation,
even among other jihadist groups, and the funding
sources in Libya were less secure than in Syria. The
Islamic State’s brutality and sectarian approach
provoked several local backlashes, and it briefly lost
Sirte in late 2015 before regaining control of the city in
early 2016. At that stage, ISIS had an estimated 1,500
fighters in the city, significantly more than AQ in 2011,
though after the United States began a campaign of air
attacks, ISIS’s numbers in the city dropped to around
1,000 fighters by August 2016.89 The drop probably
indicated both losses in combat and the exodus of
militants to other regions in North Africa.
The evidence indicates funding for ISIS in
Libya, even at the height of its power, was tight
89. Spencer Ackerman, Chris Stephen, and Ewen MacAskill,
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and unreliable.90 The Libyan group’s early funding
came from the core group in Iraq and Syria and
was supplemented by stealing the reserves from the
Central Bank of Libya (originally stolen by the local
AQ franchise). Some members were able to retain their
stipends provided by the GNC before they defected to
ISIS. The Islamic State also taxed the earnings of the
remaining state-paid officials in Sirte. But ISIS was not
able to move beyond extortion from an impoverished
community as the group failed to capture any oil or
gas production. The organization also lacked a ready
buyer; no regional state played the role for ISIS in
Libya that Turkey had in Syria. A further drain on the
group’s funds was the decision to divert substantial
funding to linked groups in the Sinai region.
At this time, ISIS had not yet taken control of
revenues from the gangs involved in people smuggling
and the drug trade due to its lack of manpower.91
This situation was unlike ISIS’s preferred operating
approach and left other criminal and political
movements active in territory it controlled.
Despite these constraints, by late 2015, ISIS had
control over multiple cities along the coast and in
the sub-Saharan region. If the group had problems
with manpower and funding, it still appeared to be
dominant, as external military attacks were piecemeal
and episodic.
THE FALL OF ISIS?
As in Syria, all the evidence shows ISIS overreached
in Libya. The group’s sectarian approach to other
90. James Roslington and Jason Pack, Who Pays for ISIS in
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groups alienated potential allies, and its framing of
any struggle as being only about its aims has reduced
popular support. As in Syria, the group was vulnerable
to external military pressure. One way ISIS was able to
survive in its strongholds was by exploiting the wider
disputes about the governance of Libya. Although
the other factions in Libya were threatened by ISIS
for taking part in the GNA framework, they stood to
make political gains if ISIS was defeated by their own
forces; this meant the final battles against ISIS were as
much a struggle for relevance between the potential
victors as an effort to drive ISIS from Libya.92
Loss of Sirte
By 2016, ISIS was in retreat due to a combination
of pressure from the main domestic Libyan factions,
renewed US and NATO attacks, and loss of support
from other Islamist factions in the country. Initially,
as the group lost ground, the risk of outright conflict
loomed among the HoR, LNA, and GNA, especially
over Sirte.93 But conflict was avoided when combat
units loyal to the GNA took Sirte in mid-2017 and
the remaining ISIS fighters fled south.94 Even more
than for AQ, the occupation of territory was a very
important part of ISIS’s global appeal and underlies
its relative dominance among the wider network of
jihadist groups.95 The loss of its bases in Syria, Iraq,
and Libya represented a major loss of face for ISIS.
But dispersion carries threats as well. Many of
ISIS’s militants in Libya came from other North African
92.
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countries, either as workers during the Gadhafi period
or to fight after 2011, and many of them have returned
to their home countries and are not easy to track.
Evidence of this dispersion exists. Some recent terrorist
attacks in Tunisia seem to have been carried out by
individuals returning from Libya.96 In addition, former
ISIS members are not the only terrorists Tunisia has to
worry about: The AQ-oriented al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghrib has become entrenched in the mountains in
the south along the Algerian border.
Since 2016, ISIS has suffered further setbacks in
Libya, limiting its control to portions of a few desert
towns.97 As a result, the group may have merged
again with the remnants of the original AQ network in
the country. But other reports suggest the two groups
remain separate, with AQ continuing its strategy
of focusing on local disputes in an attempt to gain a
foothold by seeking local alliances, especially as its
wider al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib franchise has
mostly remained loyal and has a presence in Tunisia,
Algeria, and the Saharan regions.98
As it retreated, ISIS also changed its funding
strategy. Instead of its traditional practice of
demanding payments for the use of roads and
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transportation links, it came to embrace extracting
revenue from criminal activities, especially from
drugs and people smuggling.99 The ability to extort
from criminals and the plentiful supply of weapons
suggest the group has the capacity to retain a presence
and potentially find a new route back to prominence.
The Remaining Threat
Individual ISIS fighters may simply shift to AQ
supporting groups, or ISIS may find a means to
maintain its presence in Libya. The latter would
be particularly dangerous because Libya remains
fragmented, despite further peace talks, leaving ISIS
ample scope to take advantage of Libya’s enduring
problems. The following are aspects of the remaining
threat in Libya:
1. The Islamic State has created a network in
the country, partly following the original AQ
presence, that allows it to move its base to
another district within the country.
2. As in Iraq, ISIS has apparently made an alliance
with the remnants of the previous regime’s
security network; this may give the group the
means to infiltrate the weak state structures
being set up and make it difficult to eliminate.100
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3. The refugee crisis is another ready source of
funding. Extracting money from migrants who
are fleeing war, poverty, and persecution is an
easy way to fund the group’s operations. In
addition, this funding mechanism opens another
route by which the group can send militants to
Europe, especially now that the option to move
between Syria and Turkey is limited.
4. Either unintentionally—as its fighters fled
defeat around Sirte—or as a deliberate policy
to disperse its militants across North Africa,
ISIS sent its cadres from Libya to other states.101
Because the group built up its strength in Libya
by preventing North African militants from
traveling to Syria, many of these fighters are
probably from nearby countries, such as Egypt,
Tunisia, and Algeria.
5. Finally, Libya is awash in arms.102 The Islamic
State can use this resource to arm itself or to
sustain conflicts across North Africa and into
sub-Saharan Africa. The group could exploit
plenty of extant regional conflicts, giving it the
scope to cause chaos across a vast region.
For example, ISIS could exploit the Tuareg’s
belief they are being oppressed, especially in Mali,
Niger, and Chad. The Gadhafi regime had a record of
intervention in these conflicts—in particular, the civil
101. Jack Moore, “As ISIS Flees Sirte in Libya, Tunisia Faces
Greater Threat from Returning Jihadis,” Newsweek, November 27,
2016, https://www.newsweek.com/2016/11/25/isis-flees-sirte
-libya-tunisia-faces-greater-threat-returning-jihadis-513719.html.
102. Francesco Strazzari and Simone Tholens, “‘Tesco for
Terrorists’ Reconsidered: Arms and Conflict Dynamics in Libya
and in the Sahara-Sahel Region,” European Journal on Criminal
Policy and Research 20, no. 3 (February 2014): 343–60.
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war in Chad.103 Given the links between ISIS and parts
of the Gadhafi regime, the practice of exploiting these
networks has probably been passed down to ISIS.
Haftar’s delicate relationship with Salafi groups,
which have a similar ideology to that of ISIS, must also
be a point of consideration. The renegade general has
thousands of Madkhali-Salafi militiamen under his
control. Haftar’s manpower shortages have allowed
the groups to gain increasing prominence in parts of
Libya under the LNA, even away from the battlefield
and in the LNA administration.104 In the event of a total
LNA collapse, these groups could give ISIS a boost.
Ideological overlap would provide opportunities for
fighters to move between groups, and radical shifts in
either direction could destabilize the security situation
in the country.
In recent years, ISIS detainees have been repeatedly
used for their political capital by all sides in the
Libyan conflict. Militias affiliated with the GNA are
believed to hold some 400 ISIS prisoners in facilities
in and around Misratah. The militias have indicated
an inability to hold the prisoners securely in the event
of further offenses by the LNA or a collapse of GNA
ranks. Some militia members are believed to be highranking members of ISIS’s Libya franchise. Any policy
moves must seriously consider detainees to prevent
the undoing of hard-won gains against ISIS. Dozens
of groups across Libya currently have captured ISIS
103. Devon Douglas-Bowers, “The Crisis in Mali: A Historical
Perspective on the Tuareg People,” Global Research, February 1, 2013,
https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-crisis-in-mali-a-historical
-perspective-on-the-tuareg-people/5321407.
104. David D. Kirkpatrick, “A Police State with an Islamist Twist: Inside Hifter’s Libya,” New York Times, updated
April 14, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/world
/middleeast/libya-hifter-benghazi.html.
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members under their control, potentially giving the
groups leverage, especially with international actors
such as the United States and the EU. If ISIS fighters
are to remain off the battlefield, then these groups
may need to be accommodated. But policy makers
must be wary of reports of detainee numbers, which
may be inflated.
THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES
One frustration of US policy makers was the
EU and European members of NATO neglecting to
take the lead on Libyan reconstruction and security,
which most likely will not happen because they fear
sustained intervention and the issue of refugees has
become entangled in the domestic politics of most
EU states. Italy is most directly affected by Libyan
turmoil because it is the main destination for refugees
fleeing across the central Mediterranean, has some
colonial links to Libya, and has made sustained
efforts to mitigate the refugee crisis. Other EU states
have provided some funding to help Italy with this
burden, but, like the United Kingdom, tend to frame
the issue as one of stopping migration across the
Mediterranean, rather than providing safe passage.
Though only briefly, Italy was prepared to take more
direct action against ISIS in conjunction with Egypt
before backing down under pressure from other EU
states and the United States.105
Thus, without direct US leadership, the situation
in Libya will most likely remain chaotic. The Islamic
State has been driven out of Sirte and its other
strongholds, but the situation will continue to offer the
group opportunities. Libya remains a poorly governed
105.

Toaldo, “Europe’s Options on Libya.”
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state with porous borders, copious stocks of weapons,
and various sources of income ISIS can divert to its
own coffers. The Obama administration was cautious
about direct and substantial military intervention, in
part because this might have provided ISIS with a
cause and an easily reached enemy. The Islamic State
may have also believed military intervention would
derail the attempts to forge a government of national
unity.106 Regardless, US military operations proved to
be critical in driving ISIS from Sirte and have made it
more difficult for ISIS to reestablish a presence in the
south of the country.
The Trump administration has offered several
policies on Libya. At various stages in 2017, the Trump
administration mooted partition of the country,
suggested a US withdrawal at a press conference
with the Italians, and proposed a return to a mixture
of diplomatic pressure to force a political agreement
in Libya and military help in the fight against ISIS.107
Militarily, this shift in policy seems to be connected
to a belief ISIS is on the verge of defeat, suggesting
at least some promise for the long-term governance
of Libya.108
106. Blanchard, Libya.
107. Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Julian Borger, “Trump
Aide Drew Plan on Napkin to Partition Libya into Three,” Guardian,
April 10, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017
/apr/10/libya-partition-trump-administration-sebastian
-gorka; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Donald Trump Remarks
Raise Fears of US Disengagement in Libya,” Guardian, April
21, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/21
/donald-trump-remarks-raise-fears-of-us-disengagement
-in-libya; and Barbara Starr, “US Military Considers
Ramping up Libya Presence,” CNN, July 10, 2017, https://
edition.cnn.com/2017/07/10/politics/trump-us-military
-libya-strategy/index.html.
108. Mezran and Miller, “ISIS on the Brink.”
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The important actors view the problems with Libya
in different ways, creating conflict when identifying
the overall problem. The European members of NATO
tend to see the problem in Libya as a part of their wider
issue with immigration. The Arab states are primarily
concerned with the stability of the country and the
management of various Islamic groups; the United
States, although interested in security, leans more
toward promoting its economic interests. Equally,
Libya has become another region where Turkey and
Qatar, who tend to be sympathetic to the Muslim
Brotherhood, are at odds with Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
and Sisi’s Egypt.
Although France and Britain would most likely
take the lead in their former colonies in response to
a security crisis, such as the France-led intervention
in Mali, this does not apply to Libya. The former
colonial power, Italy, left as part of a wider military
defeat and has no real residual presence beyond
commercial links. Italy is perhaps the European state
most directly affected by the crisis in Libya, but it
does not particularly see current problems in Libya as
something on which it should take the lead.
This strongly suggests the United States cannot
leave the Libyan problem to the EU or the European
members of NATO. Ideally, the United States would
work with both European and other Arab powers to
help the rebuilding process, but some sort of coherent
US response is needed. As noted, different external
powers may be funding their own proxy movements
in Libya, delaying any progress toward sound
governance.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Policy Options
The damage caused by the Anglo-French
indifference after the fall of Gadhafi has left Libya
with practically no government; rather, Libya has
two competing power groups that mirror the historic
divisions within the country.109 By late 2016, the
United States had lost patience with its European
allies and used airpower and Special Forces to attack
ISIS directly in its stronghold of Sirte.
But Libya offers ISIS far more than just a new
region for its caliphate. On Libya’s borders, the wider
tensions between Muslim and Christian communities
in the sub-Saharan region are long-standing and
exacerbated by the relative discrimination against
the Tuareg across the region. Gadhafi intervened in
these crises and civil wars in the 1970s and 1980s, so a
precedent for Libyan interaction with the region exists.
In turn, tensions in Saharan Africa are worsened by
climate change reducing crop yields and intensifying
disputes over access to water.110 Conflict will continue
or at least always be a possibility unless wider steps
are taken to help sub-Saharan Africa manage its
current problems. Without economic help, agricultural
productivity will probably halve in the next decade
in the region, triggering conflicts over the remaining
sources of food and water. A report for the EU argued
“for each dollar invested in safe drinking water, three

109. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Libya.
110. Any Freitas, “Water as a Stress Factor in Sub-Saharan
Africa,” European Union Institute for Security Studies 12 (2013).
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to four dollars are generated, depending on the region
and technology available.”111
Within Libya, ISIS may well prove to be a
transitory movement, but radical Islamism has long
had substantial influence. Although the Sanusiyahinspired LIFG may have had ideological concerns
about AQ’s Salafi mindset, individual militants found
it easy to travel between the various groups. Radical
Islamism in Libya was not imported by ISIS or AQ,
and it will remain important in Libya even if those
groups are defeated.
Framing the question of how to deal with ISIS in
Libya as purely a localized matter needing the correct
combination of military and diplomatic action is too
limited an approach. Although ISIS must be removed
from Libya, any response needs to take account of
both Libya’s history and aspirations and the extent to
which the dynamics in Libya are connected to wider
issues across North Africa.
The Islamic State’s brief period of relative
dominance was underpinned by militants drawn
from across the region. At the height of its power,
the group was able to divert funds to support the
extremist groups operating in southern Egypt and the
Sinai Peninsula, where a wider Berber demand for
better treatment was taken over by ISIS, and the group
has since diverted its militants to carry out attacks
in Tunisia.
If the United States is serious about challenging
ISIS in Libya and making progress in helping the
country rebuild and remain autonomous, it must take
the following steps:
1. The United States must assist Libya in rebuilding
state structures and be aware of ISIS’s ability
111.
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to infiltrate any emerging government. To
accomplish these objectives, the United States
should work with other Libyan groups opposed
to Gadhafi and ISIS, regardless of whether their
Islamist doctrine is palatable. The United States
must remain aware tribal networks are not the
only force in the new Libya.
2. The refugee crisis is both a potential source
of revenue for ISIS and a way to send its
militants into Europe. As long as the crossing
of the Mediterranean is under the control of
unscrupulous criminal gangs, it will remain a
potential source of revenue. The United States
must use whatever leverage it has in Europe to
pressure the Europeans into establishing safe,
official routes onto the continent for genuine
refugees in need of asylum and aid Italy and
the GNA in Libya to cope with the financial
and logistical requirements of managing
refugee flows.
3. Finally, ISIS and AQ are adept at manipulating
genuine grievances for their own ends; as a
result, attention needs to be paid to the range
of conflicts across Saharan Africa. Nearly all of
these conflicts can be exploited by ISIS, especially
in regions where the conflict is also between
Muslims and Christians, but all of these conflicts
have their own local dynamics and causes.
Seeking to defuse these grievances is a wider but
necessary agenda for the United States, as well
as the EU, and much can be done to prevent ISIS
by helping the local administrations manage
the increasing pressures created by climate
change on water and food supplies, either with
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humanitarian aid or by providing technological
and logistical knowledge and resources.
Diplomatic Options
Similar to the EU, the Obama administration
was initially unwilling to intervene too directly
in the military conflict against ISIS, preferring to
pursue diplomatic initiatives to resolve the internal
divisions that emerged after 2011. This approach
was commendable, but it needed two key conditions
to work. First, the process needed to be actively
managed because the Libyan groups were unlikely
to reach a compromise by themselves.112 Second, the
process needed to be closed-ended. The latter point
is perhaps the key criticism that can be leveled at the
various UN and EU attempts so far. As noted above,
the GNA structure has been agreed in principle, but
the problem lies in implementation.
The Trump administration should support the UN
in ensuring a unitary government that holds the country
together emerges as soon as possible. Achieving
this objective would help to facilitate elections at the
earliest feasible opportunity to determine once and
for all the entity that holds democratic legitimacy.
Indulging the GNA, which has little influence outside
Tripoli or the HoR, in its desire to keep control of key
institutions and facilities risks repeating the problems
that blighted Yemen after unification in 1990 because
the state would permanently fracture into competing
power bases. In Yemen, unification brought a division
of responsibilities along north-south lines and the
creation of dual structures so that senior officials from
112.
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both states kept their jobs.113 The short-term result was
political and economic paralysis. In the longer term,
this solution created the conditions first for the civil
unrest between 2011 and 2012, and now for the civil
war in the country. Libya must avoid these mistakes.
A related problem is, as in Syria, Libya is becoming
an arena where the struggles between other powers are
enacted. In recent years, the main focus has been on the
Shia-Sunni conflict and how this is reflected, at a state
level, as a fundamental antagonism between Iran and
the Saudis. This focus has meant not enough attention
has been given to the developing disputes between
Sunni states, especially those among the UAE, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey. These disputes
have occurred partially for political reasons, as states
seek to deal with groups they believe are linked to
sources of domestic discontent. The Egyptians, since
Sisi seized power, have supported the Benghazi-based
HoR/LNA against the Tripoli-based GNA due to the
presence of groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.
As a result, all states that are active in Libya
need to back the formal UN process and an early
plebiscite. Support for the GNA by the UN will
not be unconditional because elements within the
GNA clearly share the underlying Salafi views of
ISIS and AQ, but the UAE, Russia, and Saudi Arabia
continuing to sponsor the HoR/LNA would simply
delay any return of formal governance to Libya. Now
that the LNA’s attempt to impose military dominance
has failed, a return to some form of mediated political
process is essential.

113. Noel Brehony, Yemen Divided: The Story of a Failed State
in South Arabia (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011).
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Military Options
As a significant military threat in Libya, ISIS
has been defeated. A combination of local efforts,
international airpower, and Special Forces has forced
ISIS to the southern margins of the country. Like any
well-motivated terrorist group, ISIS has the capacity
to withstand setbacks, and driving the group from its
last bastions may require significant effort. The Islamic
State’s resilience suggests some military commitment
within Libya, especially to provide the resources the
local militias lack, is needed.
The more pressing requirement is linked to the
need to ensure Libya can start to operate as a unitary
state. To achieve this goal, in the short term, the UN
arms embargo must be reimposed, and Turkey, the
UAE, Russia, and Saudi Arabia must stop sending
weaponry to the parties. Beyond these measures,
the Libyan military needs to be placed back on a
professional footing, and it needs to assist in the
complex process of disarming local militias and
ensuring the writ of the government is accepted across
the country.
To avoid making the same mistakes that have been
made in Syria and to repeat at least those aspects of
the Afghanistan War that have been successful, the
United States should be the sole agent providing the
training and materiel for the new Libyan army so the
country can control the army’s membership and keep
away known jihadists.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Islamic State’s brief opportunity to establish
territorial domination in Libya has seemingly passed.
As in Iraq and Syria, the military defeat of ISIS
occurred because it overreached and alienated all
potential allies with its sectarian policies. But the West
cannot be complacent because many ISIS members
in Libya are former members of the AQ network,
and many come from other North African countries.
These members may well disperse across the region,
which has no shortage of existing conflicts, or switch
allegiance again to a new jihadist group.
Within Libya, the criminality that was unleashed
with the fall of Gadhafi remains unchecked. The
focus of this criminal activity, at the moment, is arms
and drug smuggling and extracting wealth from the
refugees flowing through the country. The Islamic
State and AQ can fund themselves effectively, either
by extorting the criminals or by taking a share of
this criminal activity to sustain some presence in the
country. At the moment, ISIS has been defeated in
Libya, but its ideology persists. As long as the group
can exploit real grievances or find sponsors in the
struggles between external powers, it may be able
to reestablish itself. And if not ISIS, then a successor
jihadist organization may well rise out of one or
another conflict in North Africa and the Middle East.

APPENDIX
Table A-1. List of names and groups
General National
Congress (GNC)

Broad Islamist movement based around Tripoli.

Government of
National Accord
(GNA)

Notionally the current government of Libya
backed by the United Nations, Turkey, and
Qatar.

House of
Representatives
(HoR)

Broad Islamist movement based around
Tobruk.

Libya Dawn

A militia that emerged in the 2011 rebellion
against Muammar Gadhafi. Libya Dawn took
control of Tripoli in 2014 and has close links to
the Muslim Brotherhood.

Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group
(LIFG)

The principal Islamist opposition to Gadhafi
during the period 1995–2010. Members had
close links to al-Qaeda (AQ) but, as a group, it
did not share AQ’s focus on international jihad.

Libyan Islamic
Movement

Emerged in 2011, possibly with members who
left the LIFG. The Libyan Islamic Movement
is based near Tripoli and is part of the Libya
Dawn militia group.

65

Table A-1 (continued)

Libyan National
Army (LNA)

Having emerged in 2014, the LNA is backed by
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia,
and Egypt as a counterweight to the growing
importance of the GNA and GNC.

Popular Front for
the Liberation of
Palestine-General
Command

A Marxist group within the wider Palestinian
movement. The group was funded by Gadhafi
and may have been used by the regime to
transfer weapons and money to other terrorist
movements in Western Europe.

Sanusiyah

A form of Islam that appeared in Libya and
the Sudan in the late nineteenth century. The
Sanusiyah influenced the 1951–69 monarchy
and the basic ideology behind the Islamist
LIFG in modern-day Libya.

Transitional
National Council

The umbrella group that led the opposition to
Gadhafi during the Libya revolt of 2011.
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